version 1.7.2.3 - CVE-2014-0019: fixed PROXY-CONNECT address overflow

CHANGES

@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
 
+####################### V 1.7.2.3:
+
+security:
+	CVE-2014-0019: socats PROXY-CONNECT address was vulnerable to a buffer
+	overflow with data from command line (see socat-secadv5.txt)
+	Credits to Florian Weimer of the Red Hat Product Security Team
+
 ####################### V 1.7.2.2:
 
 security:

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-"1.7.2.2"
+"1.7.2.3"

test.sh

@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ withroot=0	# perform privileged tests even if not run by root
 #SOCAT_EGD="egd=/dev/egd-pool"
 MISCDELAY=1
 [ -z "$SOCAT" ] && SOCAT="./socat"
+if [ ! -x "$SOCAT" ]; then
+    echo "$SOCAT does not exist" >&2; exit 1;
+fi
 [ -z "$PROCAN" ] && PROCAN="./procan"
 [ -z "$FILAN" ] && FILAN="./filan"
 opts="$opt_t $OPTS"
@@ -10876,6 +10879,56 @@ esac
 PORT=$((PORT+1))
 N=$((N+1))
 
+
+if false; then	# this overflow is not reliably reproducable
+# socat up to 2.0.0-b6 did not check the length of the PROXY-CONNECT command line paramters when copying them into the HTTP request buffer. This could lead to a buffer overflow.
+NAME=PROXY_ADDR_OVFL
+case "$TESTS" in
+*%functions%*|*%bugs%*|*%security%*|*%socket%*|*%$NAME%*)
+TEST="$NAME: proxy address parameters overflow"
+# invoke socat PROXY-CONNECT with long proxy server and target server names. If it terminates with exit code >= 128 it is vulnerable
+# However, even if vulnerable it often does not crash. Therefore we try to use a boundary check program like ElectricFence; only with its help we can tell that clean run proofs absence of vulnerability
+if ! eval $NUMCOND; then :; else
+tf="$td/test$N.stdout"
+te="$td/test$N.stderr"
+tdiff="$td/test$N.diff"
+da="test$N $(date) $RANDOM"
+EF=; for p in ef; do
+    if type ef >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	EF="ef "; break
+    fi
+done
+CMD0="$SOCAT $opts TCP-LISTEN:$PORT,reuseaddr FILE:/dev/null"
+#CMD1="$EF $SOCAT $opts FILE:/dev/null PROXY-CONNECT:$(perl -e "print 'A' x 256"):$(perl -e "print 'A' x 256"):80"
+CMD1="$EF $SOCAT $opts FILE:/dev/null PROXY-CONNECT:localhost:$(perl -e "print 'A' x 384"):80,proxyport=$PORT"
+printf "test $F_n $TEST... " $N
+$CMD0 >/dev/null 2>"${te}0" &
+pid0=$!
+waittcp4port $PORT 1
+$CMD1 >/dev/null 2>"${te}1"
+rc1=$?
+if [ $rc1 -lt 128 ]; then
+    if [ "$EF" ]; then
+	$PRINTF "$OK\n"
+	numOK=$((numOK+1))
+    else
+	$PRINTF "$UNKNOWN $RED(install ElectricFEnce!)$NORMAL\n"
+	numCANT=$((num+1))
+    fi
+else
+    $PRINTF "$FAILED\n"
+    echo "$CMD1"
+    cat "${te}"
+    numFAIL=$((numFAIL+1))
+fi
+fi # NUMCOND
+ ;;
+esac
+PORT=$((PORT+1))
+N=$((N+1))
+fi	# false
+
+
 ###############################################################################
 # here come tests that might affect your systems integrity. Put normal tests
 # before this paragraph.

xio-proxy.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* source: xio-proxy.c */
-/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger 2002-2011 */
+/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger */
 /* Published under the GNU General Public License V.2, see file COPYING */
 
 /* this file contains the source for opening addresses of HTTP proxy CONNECT
@@ -275,8 +275,9 @@ int _xioopen_proxy_connect(struct single *xfd,
 			   struct proxyvars *proxyvars,
 			   int level) {
    size_t offset;
-   char request[CONNLEN];
+   char request[CONNLEN];	/* HTTP connection request line */
-   char buff[BUFLEN+1];
+   int rv;
+   char buff[BUFLEN+1];		/* for receiving HTTP reply headers */
 #if CONNLEN > BUFLEN
 #error not enough buffer space 
 #endif
@@ -286,8 +287,12 @@ int _xioopen_proxy_connect(struct single *xfd,
    ssize_t sresult;
 
    /* generate proxy request header - points to final target */
-   sprintf(request, "CONNECT %s:%u HTTP/1.0\r\n",
+   rv = snprintf(request, CONNLEN, "CONNECT %s:%u HTTP/1.0\r\n",
 		 proxyvars->targetaddr, proxyvars->targetport);
+   if (rv >= CONNLEN || rv < 0) {
+      Error("_xioopen_proxy_connect(): PROXY CONNECT buffer too small");
+      return -1;
+   }
 
    /* send proxy CONNECT request (target addr+port) */
    * xiosanitize(request, strlen(request), textbuff) = '\0';